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Frequencies of Board Meetings on Various Topics and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from China 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between number of topic-specific board meetings and 
quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO 
turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-
specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors of Chinese listed 
firms. We find that more frequent discussions of growth strategies related to the use of IPO 
proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. 
By contrast, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are 
likely to reduce the sensitivities of both CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our 
findings shed light on what makes boards efficient, and how board monitoring of assorted 
decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.  
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1. Introduction 
Board meetings, possibly the most easily observed board activity, are often advocated by the 
public and regulators as a way to enhance board effectiveness in public companies. 
Regulators (e.g. in the US, UK, India, and China) often require listed companies to hold a 
minimum number of meetings every year. However, a high number of meetings does not 
necessarily suggest a board functions well, owing to the fact that the topics of board meetings 
are diverse. At board meetings, various proposals (e.g. business strategy, risk oversight, CEO 
succession planning) are discussed by the directors. It is not the number of board meetings 
that indicates the success of a ERDUG¶V HIIRUWV LQ PRQLWRring, but the ratification and 
monitoring of corporate proposals in board meetings, which help boards to monitor and 
assess CEOs (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).   
 The monitoring of assorted types of proposals provides boards with channels for 
evaluating CEO and corporate performance. Boards of directors often have limited access to 
firm information (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Jensen, 1993). At board meetings, they rely 
on the supplementary information provided in proposals to make decisions. This means that 
most additional information acquired by boards is proposal-based. The amount, range and 
complexity of the information received by directors influences their performance (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005). Board activities related to major proposals 
enhance the efficiency of the directors as a group, as this  involves exchanging information 
and interacting with each other (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Thus, 
board activities related to various proposals represent board supervisory effectiveness in 
corresponding dimensions. 
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 Boards of directors play a major role in mitigating agency problems associated with the 
separation between ownership and control (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and 
Meckling,  :LWKRXW ERDUGV¶ monitoring, management teams are more likely to take 
self-benefitting actions, and deviate from the interests of residual claimants. Agency models 
prescribe normative actions such that compensation is related to effort and performance, and 
boards fire poorly performing CEOs. CEO dismissal and compensation are the most 
important decisions made by boards of directors (Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin, 2005; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Therefore, the effectiveness of these decisions indicates the 
effectiveness of the ERDUG¶V supervisory role in monitoring the CEO, and represents the 
quality of governance.  
 Our study provides new evidence of board effectiveness by looking into the black box of 
board meetings via various supervisory activities. We use number and type of meeting to 
proxy for board supervisory activities on assorted proposals. The CEO dismissal-performance 
relationship and compensation-performance relationship are used as proxies for quality of 
corporate governance, as widely applied in previous literature (e.g. Adams et al., 2010; 
Gibson, 2003; Kato and Long, 2006a). We investigate the relationship between number of 
topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. 
 Observing board monitoring of different types of proposals is not straightforward, due to 
data confidentiality. Almost two decades ago, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) introduced an innovative practice whereby independent directors were obliged to 
issue Report[s] of the Independent Director after board meetings.1  The reports publicly 
disclose topics discussed at meetings and the opinions of the independent directors on these 
topics. This represents a novel approach to enriching corporate disclosure and board 
                                                 
1
 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China in 2001 and 2002. 
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accountability in the decision-making process. From these reports, we are able to capture 
task-based board activities on six major topics: personnel changes, compensation, financial 
reports and audit, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure, and growth strategies. 
 In China (as in many other emerging markets), the legal protection of investor rights and 
accounting standards are less developed than in Western countries. Evidence on CEO 
dismissal/compensation and firm performance based on Chinese data is not widely available, 
and the concrete factors affecting CEO contracting are yet to be established conclusively. In 
the limited studies that do exist, results are mixed (e.g. Conyon and He, 2012, 2014; Fung 
and Pecha, 2018). Empirical studies focusing on board effectiveness in China often utilize the 
proportion of independent directors on the board or annual board meeting frequency as 
proxies for board monitoring. They show mixed results on whether increasing board 
monitoring benefits corporate governance (Peng, 2004; Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006; 
Kato and Long, 2006a; Liu et al., 2015).  
 Our study focuses on the topics boards discuss during meetings, and provides new 
evidence on board effectiveness in China. We apply panel data techniques to explore the 
moderating effects of specific topics discussed at board meetings on the sensitivity of CEO 
dismissal/compensation to performance. Furthermore, we extend our analysis with dynamic 
panel data (DPD-GMM) regressions to mitigate possible endogeneity issues. Our key 
findings show that CEO dismissal and compensation are related to firm performance in China, 
suggesting that the corporate governance mechanism is effective in contracting and 
monitoring executives. Pay-performance sensitivity is strengthened by additional board 
monitoring efforts involving GLVFXVVLRQV RI ILUPV¶ JURZWK VWUDWHJLHV LH LQYHVWPHQWV DQG
acquisitions). In contrast, the relationships between CEO dismissal/pay and firm performance 
are weaker when there are more board activities concerning the nominations of directors and 
top management.  
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  We also investigate whether the effects of board activities vary under different ownership 
structures. 7KHPDMRULW\RI&KLQD¶VOLVWHGILUPVare controlled by either state shareholders or 
non-state shareholders (i.e. private firms or individuals). State shareholders have political and 
economic considerations, while non-state shareholders are mainly profit-driven (Allen et al., 
2005; Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006). Under different ownership structures, controlling 
shareholders have different primary motives, which leads to different influences on managers. 
The different influences lead to the same topics being discussed in different ways, thereby 
influencing governance quality. We find that the negative moderation effect of nomination 
meetings on the relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance is significant in 
non-state-controlled firms, yet there is no effect in state-controlled firms. Further, the 
moderation effect of growth-strategy meetings on the CEO-pay-to-performance sensitivity is 
positive in both non-state-controlled and state-controlled firms. 
 Our research contributes to the corporate governance literature in the following ways. First, 
it is related to the literature that examines board effectiveness and its influence upon firm 
performance. Previous studies (e.g. Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010; Schwartz-Ziv 
and Weisbach, 2013) in the field of board effectiveness have only focused on board 
characteristics, and drawn inferences about how board characteristics could affect their 
activities, and ultimately impact firm value. To our best knowledge, our study is the first to 
conduct systematic research of whether board activities on assorted topics affect the quality 
of corporate governance. We show that board activities related to strategic decisions can alter 
the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.  
 Second, our study contributes to the dynamic debate among academics and practitioners 
on the importance of board meetings. This study provides novel empirical evidence on how 
boards¶ task performance links with governance at the firm level. Consistent with the 
prediction of the board process model (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 1999) that board task 
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performance can improve corporate governance, we find that meetings on growth strategies 
have positive effects on corporate governance, although meetings with assorted emphases 
have different effects. Given that previous studies (e.g. Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 
1999) only take annual meeting frequency into account, we argue that our proxies for board 
monitoring activities are more accurate. 
 Finally, our study provides the first large-sample evidence of board monitoring activities 
improving corporate governance. Previous studies (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao, 2016; Ma and 
Khanna, 2016; Tang, Du, and Hou, 2013), also employing data from independent director 
reports, focus on how independent directors improve governance via dissension reports. They 
investigate the effect of dissension on the stock market, and explore which factors increase 
the probability of dissenting votes from independent directors. However, the dissensions only 
account for less than 2% of all reports. Our results using all the data specify that the various 
monitoring activities conducted in the board room have different effects on the sensitivities of 
CEO dismissal/compensation to performance. This lends support to the idea that 
(independent) board governance can offset the power of CEOs and controlling shareholders 
in China. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the institutional 
background and literature review. Sections 3 and 4 describe the sample data and explain our 
research design. The penultimate section contains the empirical results and discussion. In the 
final section, we present our conclusions and discuss areas for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Institutional Background and Corporate Governance in China 
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 &KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFUHIRUPbegan following the study of the modern corporate governance 
systems of Western FRXQWULHV,Q&KLQDLQWURGXFHG*HUPDQ\¶VWZR-tier board system, 
consisting of the main board and a supervisory board. In most state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the government had a significant impact on the nominations and appointments to 
both boards. The top management of firms worked as bureaucrats, and the supervisory boards 
had little motivation and ambiguous accountability when it came to monitoring managers and 
firm operations (Allen et al, 2005; Cheng, 1999; Conyon and He, 2011).  
 In order to deepen the economic reforms and protect the interests of minority shareholders, 
from 2001 onwards the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) mimicked the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in adopting new corporate governance mechanisms. It issued guidelines 
and regulations (2001, 2002) that compelled each listed firm to have independent directors on 
its main board and to improve the quality of its information disclosure. The proportion of 
independent directors was required to be at least one-third by June 2003, while independent 
directors were required to publish the Report of the Independent Director after board 
meetings (CSRC, 2001). As a result, the protection of public shareholder interests and the 
transparency of information disclosure have improved (CSRC, 2004).  
 In 2005, WKH LQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUV¶V\VWHPJDLQHG OHJDOVWDWXV IRU WKH ILUVW WLPH when it 
was authorized in the new Company Law of China (2005). Independent directors, as a group 
of corporate agents, are not affiliated with the listed firm or the controlling shareholders, and, 
as was set out, µVKDOO EH HVSHFLDOO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK SURWHFWLQJ WKH LQWHUHVWV RI PLQRULW\
VKDUHKROGHUV IURP EHLQJ LQIULQJHG¶ &65& . Furthermore, independent directors are 
legally liable for disclosing fraud and irregularities of listed firms through the Report of the 
Independent Directors. The report must state whether independent directors agree with 
important managerial proposals discussed at the board meeting. Specifically, it is mandatory 
that votes on firm decisions are revealed (CSRC, 2001).  
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 These reports provide a unique dataset from China allowing us to study corporate boards 
that typically function inside black boxes. Recent studies (Jiang et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2013) 
show thaW LQGHSHQGHQW GLUHFWRUV¶ dissensions in board meetings are a valid signal of the 
presence of effective corporate governance. Tang et al. (2013) find that the stock market has 
a negative reaction to announcements of independent reports referring to dissenting votes. 
The probability of receiving a negative report is higher for firms with more serious agency 
problems. Jiang et al. (2016) show that independent directors who have higher human capital 
concerns are more likely to give negative opinions in their reports. The directors issuing 
dissensions are rewarded by more directorships and has lower likelihood of regulatory 
sanctions. These studies suggest that directorV¶ dissenting votes enhance corporate 
governance and market transparency primarily through the responses of stakeholders to the 
information released about dissenting votes.  
 However, the dissenting reports account for merely 1.31% of all the reports in the dataset 
from 2005 to 2010 (Tang et al., 2013), and less than 2% from 2005 to 2015, based on our 
sample. In fact, the low rate of dissent is not unique to China. Director dissensions are rarely 
observed worldwide (e.g. approximately 2% in ten Israel firms over three years, according to 
board meeting minutes) (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). In addition, studies focusing on 
the dissenting votes ignore directors¶roles in FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHLQµQRUPDO¶situations.  
 By fully utilizing the data from all the independent directors¶UHSRUWV, we extract proposal-
based board monitoring activities; specifically, topic-specific meeting frequencies. Thus, we 
provide systematic, large-sample empirical work, examining whether and how board 
monitoring based on particular topics enhances quality of corporate governance. This 
highlights the role of the board of directors in modifying the relationship between CEO 
interests and firm performance in day-to-day supervision.  
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2.2 CEO Dismissal and Compensation, Firm Performance and Boards of Directors in China 
 
 The board is responsible for designing a compensation contract that will motivate the CEO, 
rewarding acceptable firm performance, and punishing (and in extreme cases, dismissing) the 
CEO for poor performance (Fama, 1980). Worldwide (but heavily focused on the US market), 
research on the subject has mostly been restricted to investigating how board composition 
and features influence the relationships between CEO rewards and firm performance. These 
characteristics include independent director composition (Dah, Frye, and Hurst, 2014), board 
size (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), CEO-chairman duality (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), 
board gender or ethnic diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter, 2010), GLUHFWRUV¶
reputation (e.g. Shivdasani, 1993), and the working backgrounds of board members (e.g. 
Francis, Hasan, and Wu, 2015). 
 The limited empirical literature based on the Chinese market shows mixed results on the 
drivers of CEO dismissal and compensation. The statistical significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients linking CEO dismissal/compensation to performance vary, depending on 
performance measures and sample periods (e.g. Bai and Xu, 2005; Conyon and He, 2011, 
2014; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006; Kato and Long, 2006b). For instance, CEO turnover is 
more likely to be associated with accounting performance, and less with market-based 
performance (Conyon and He, 2014). Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007), using data from 1998 to 
2000, find that CEO compensation in China is more likely to be connected to firm accounting 
performance (i.e. return on assets, ROA) than market performance. 
Research XVLQJGDWDRQ&KLQD¶VOLVWHGILUPV documents mixed results on the influence of 
independent directors on top executive turnover/compensation. Kato and Long (2006) find 
that the presence of independent directors between 1999 to 2002 enhanced the relationship 
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between turnover and performance. Conyon and He (2011), based on data from 2001 to 2005, 
argue that non-state (privately) controlled firms, and firms with more independent directors 
on the board, are more likely to replace their CEO due to poor performance. In contrast, Firth, 
Fung, and Rui (2006) show that the turnover-performance sensitivity is lower if more 
independent directors are on the board. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) show firms with more 
non-executive directors are more likely to use performance-based pay, and firms that have a 
joint CEO/chairman position are less likely to use performance-based pay. Conyon and He 
(2011) find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-
performance link, for data from 2001 to 2005.  
The Chinese corporate governance framework has several features that may not exist in 
Western economies. For historical reasons, many firms are still controlled or influenced by 
the state. Profitability is not the only goal of the state owners. Directors in state-controlled 
firms are representatives of the state, or state agents, and they may be more concerned about 
their political careers than the professional managerial market (Wang, 2015). Thus, non-
profit goals are often what state-controlled shareholders pursue, but this is against minority 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWs (Allen et al., 2005). As a result, independent directors do not dismiss 
CEOs of poorly performing firms (Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006). In non-state-controlled firms, 
managers are often the controlling shareholders themselves or strongly aligned with the 
controlling shareholders. It is more challenging for such boards to discipline the entrenched 
managers. The effectiveness of board monitoring is likely to differ between state-controlled 
and non-state-controlled firms. 
 
 
2.3 Topic-Specific Board Meetings and Corporate Governance in China 
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 Directors (especially independent directors) are not full-time employees of the companies 
they serve. Board meetings offer directors more time to carry out their monitoring functions. 
Interactions and communications during meetings provide directors with more information 
about the firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Meetings also have the benefit of strengthening 
cohesion among directors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). From this point of view, the more 
frequent the meetings, the better the monitoring and control, resulting in better corporate 
governance outcomes. However, Jensen (1993) points out that too many inefficient and 
routine meetings are held primarily to satisfy the requirements of firm hierarchy and 
regulation, which is the main critique of the meaningfulness of board activities.  
 Previous studies on board meetings (Adams, 2005; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 
1999) most often portray them  as rather homogeneous and monolithic. Vafeas (1999) finds 
that poor performance increases the frequency of board meetings, while the number of board 
meetings has no effect on CEO turnover/performance sensitivity in the US market. However, 
more board meetings and higher meeting attendances do not effectively prevent the 
management from engaging in opportunistic behaviours (e.g. Lo, Wong, and Firth, 2010). 
 Topic-specific meetings provide directors with corporate information on various 
dimensions, which are fundamental to board decisions. Meeting frequencies on assorted 
important topics are also effective measures of how directors fulfil their monitoring 
obligations, because boards of directors put most of their effort into monitoring sundry 
management decisions (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Stiles, 2001). For example, board 
meetings on accounting practice and reporting requirements can directly reveal managerial 
malfeasance (e.g. Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Meetings on hiring, firing and assessment of top 
management and directors disclose the bargaining that goes on between CEOs and boards of 
directors (e.g. Adams et al., 2010). Furthermore, meetings on the selection of projects and 
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strategy provide boards with insights into CEO types (good or bad) based on the NPVs of the 
CEO¶V projects (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser, 2008). 
 We hypothesize that, if the board of directors works effectively in China, the meeting 
frequency on certain topics could enhance the relationship between CEO turnover (or 
compensation) and firm performance. In contrast, if the sensitivities between CEO interests 
and firm performance are not altered by the number of meetings on any topics, it may suggest 
that board monitoring at such meetings is not effective. Our study provides evidence on how 
topic-specific board meetings directly affect the quality of corporate governance in China.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 We perform our analysis on a sample of firms listed on the Main Boards of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period 2005-2015. Financial and corporate 
governance information is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. A number of screening procedures are applied to our original sample. 
First, we exclude financial firms because of their special regulations and accounting 
standards. Second, we only retain those firms with at least three consecutive fiscal years of 
capital market and financial statement data. Third, to alleviate the influence of extreme values, 
all firm-level financial data are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We end up with 14,359 
firm-year observations after applying this selection process. 
 The public release of the Report of the Independent Director, from which our measures of 
topic-specific meetings are collected, began in 2001 and became µcompulsory¶ in 2003. 
During 2003-2005, reports were only issued by listed firms on a µYROXQWDUy¶ basis, as the 
CSRC requirements for issuing such reports were unclear. The Information Disclosure 
Standards (CSRC, 2005) further clarified the disclosure requirements. After 2005, the 
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QXPEHU RI LQGHSHQGHQW GLUHFWRUV¶ UHSRUWV LQFUHDVHG sharply. For each report, the CSMAR 
recorGVWKHILUP¶VVWRFNFRGHWKHLVVXLQJGDWHWKHWRSLFVGLVFXVVHGWKHLQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUV¶
opinions, and the entire contents of the report (see Appendix A for an example of an 
LQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUV¶UHSRUW Reports contain various combinations of topics, in accordance 
with the topic(s) discussed at the board meeting in question. A large proportion of reports 
embrace multiple topics. The descriptions of topics are brief, and usually do not provide 
detailed explanations of why independent directors support related proposals. We use the 
frequency with which a topic is discussed at board meetings over a year as a proxy for board 
monitoring activity on the particular topic. 
 Column 1 of Table 1 reports mandatory disclosure subjects in the independent directors¶
reports recorded in the CSMAR database. Based on the content and roles of these topics in 
corporate governance, we group them into six major topics, as in Column 2 of Table 1, 
namely Nomination (A), Compensation (B), Financial reports and audit (C), Corporate 
control transactions (D), Change of equity structure (E) and Growth strategies (F). Tang et al. 
(2013) use a similar categorization of topics.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.1 Types of Board Meeting 
 
 Nomination. A role typically associated with the board of directors is control of the 
process by which top executives are hired, promoted, assessed and, if necessary, dismissed. 
                                                 
2
 We also used eleven topics in robustness tests (available upon request). Our main results were unchanged. 
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Nomination decisions of board members and top management may also reflect the power 
dynamics between the CEO and the board. If the board is weak, the CEO turnover and salary 
might not be significantly related to firm performance (Boyd, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that board monitoring is weakened if the selection of 
directors is not independent from the CEO. 
 Compensation. The board is also responsible for keeping the levels of remuneration 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors. Empirical studies in China often find a 
weak association between CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g. Firth et al., 2006a). 
Although boards of directors are supposed to monitor for excess compensation of executives, 
they hardly ever confront management except when it comes to firing them. Brick, Palmon, 
and Wald (2006) find that director pay is positively related to CEO pay. They also find 
evidence that excess compensation (for both directors and CEO) is associated with firm 
underperformance, indicating mutual back scratching or cronyism among the CEO and 
directors.  
 Financial report and audit, and corporate control transactions. Boards of directors are 
also responsible for overseeing internal control, approval of financial statements, and 
reporting to the shareholders. TKH³financial reports and audit´ meetings include meetings on 
issuing/amending annual reports, DXGLWRUV¶ UHSRUWVDQd auditor changes. ³Corporate control 
transactions´ LQYROYH UHODWHG-party transactions, loan guarantees and the disposal of assets. 
These transactions may be associated ZLWK D PDQDJHU¶V RU a controlling shareholder¶V 
³tunnelling RUSURSSLQJ´EHKDYLRXU, which can harm shareholders¶ interests (e.g. Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). Board meetings on these topics assist the board in fulfilling their 
disciplinary role, which reduces the probability of financial fraud and PDQDJHUV¶ tunnelling 
behaviour.  
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 Growth strategies. Setting the strategic direction of the company is another role the board 
serves (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Meetings on growth strategies enable boards of directors 
to re-evaluate CEO capability and firm fundamentals. The board makes decisions on issues 
that are critical and strategic, such as acquiring a new firm, divesting a division or negotiating 
a takeover bid (Baysinger and Bulter, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
Meetings on growth strategies include the use of IPO proceeds, investments and acquisitions, 
and financing.   
 Change of equity structure. Our sample period coincides with the split share structure 
reform in China. Prior to 2005, listed firms in China were characterized by a split share 
structure, in which two-thirds of the state-owned shares were not tradable. These non-
tradable shares were largely blamed for some serious corporate governance issues and a lack 
of incentives for managers under the state-ownership structure. In April 2005, the CSRC 
initiated a split share structure reform, which enabled state shareholders of listed firms to 
trade their restricted shares. Board meeting decisions related to the split share structure 
reform could change a firP¶VRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH, so eventually cause a change in WKHILUP¶V
internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Cao, Pan, and Tian, 2011).  
 Table 2 presents the sample distribution and descriptive statistics for the six types of 
meeting across industries. Generally, the meeting frequencies of the six topics are steady 
across industries. Accommodation and Catering (H) and Culture and Sports and 
Entertainment (M) tend to have slightly more meetings than other industries, but account for 
just 1.9% of the sample. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.2 Key Variables 
 
 CEO dismissal. The top executive in a Chinese listed firm is often the chairperson (or 
general manager) of the board. She/he is the legal representative of the firm, works full time, 
and is involved in the ILUP¶V GDLO\ GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ (e.g. Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and 
Long, 2006a). Consistent with previous studies, we adopt the title of CEO for the top 
executive, to avoid confusion. CEO dismissal is coded as a dichotomous variable, which 
equals one if a CEO is forcefully dismissed, and zero otherwise. In line with previous studies 
(e.g. Chang and Wong, 2009; You and Du, 2012), we exclude voluntary turnover because of 
health issues or retirement, based on public information (recorded in the CSMAR dataset), 
retaining only the forced dismissals.  
 Panel A of Table 3 exhibits the yearly distribution for CEO dismissal. During our sample 
period, we identify 2,556 forced CEO dismissals among the 14,359 firm-year observations. If 
a firm has two or more dismissals in one fiscal year, we merely count the last one. The 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover is approximately 18%, implying an average CEO tenure 
of less than five years, which is consistent with the findings of Conyon and He (2014) and 
similar to the turnover rate in the US (Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Compensation. Executive compensation schemes in China typically include three 
components: cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Although the CSRC has permitted stock 
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option trading since 2005, their adoption in equity compensation is rare: only 1.5% of CEOs 
received equity grants in 2005, a figure that rose to 3.5% in 2010 (Conyon and He, 2012). 
Empirical studies estimate that Chinese executives may receive µperks¶ from their companies, 
accounting for approximately 15-32% of total compensation, but these are rarely disclosed in 
financial reports and are difficult to assess using public data. Hence, compensation in this 
study is the reported sum of cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Compensation is measured 
as the average compensation of the three highest-paid management executives and directors 
in a firm, consistent with prior research (e.g. Conyon and He, 2012). 
 Panel A of Table 3 illustrates that executive compensation has risen rapidly. The amount 
paid in 2015, about 802,000 RMB (116,500 USD), was triple that in 2005 (230,000 RMB / 
33,400 USD). Although executive compensation is not as high as that in the US, it is ten 
times the average wage of employees in the same industry, according to data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The logarithm of executive compensation is included 
in our regressions. Chinese listed firms probably set up their compensation contracts using 
industry benchmarks (Jiang, Liao, Lin, and Liu, 2018). In our regressions, we use Industry-
adjusted compensation as a proxy for excess compensation, which is GHILQHGDV WKH ILUP¶V
compensation minus the average compensation in the same industry, based on the CSRC 
industry code, in the given year. The untabulated results obtained by using raw compensation 
are similar. 
 
 Topic-specific meetings. Panel B of Table 3 details the descriptive statistics and annual 
meeting frequencies for each specific topic. Although the annual number of meetings does 
not change much (about eight or ten meetings per year, see last row of Panel A-Table 3), the 
topics discussed at the meetings show significant variation. Since 2005, proposals of firm 
control transactions (e.g. related-party transactions) have been the most frequently discussed 
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topic, at 1.74 times per firm-year. The nomination of directors and executives is the second 
most frequent, occurring about once per firm-year. The number of meetings about 
compensation changes increases from 96 in 2005 to 915 in 2015, which is in line with the 
rapid increase in executive compensation over that period. The average meeting frequencies 
for the topics of financial reports and audit and growth strategies are 0.42 and 0.35, 
respectively. The frequency of meetings on changes in equity structure is likely influenced by 
government policy. In 2005, the CSRC instigated the split share structure reform, setting a 
deadline for the end of 2006. As most of the equity structure changes were related to non-
tradable shares, mostly owned by SOEs or government agencies, being transformed into 
tradable shares, the frequency of meetings on equity structure changes peaked at 1,055 in the 
year 2006.  
 Panel C of Table 3 shows how meeting frequencies vary with firm size. Board 
characteristics and monitoring activities may differ based on organizational complexity; one 
such characteristic is firm size (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Vafeas, 1999). Thus, 
we divide firm-year observations into three groups based on corporate book value: small 
firms (the lower third of the distribution), median firms (the median third) and large firms 
(the higher third). Among the six topics of meetings, frequencies for four topics increase with 
firm size: nomination, compensation, corporate control transactions, and growth strategies. In 
particular, the number of meetings about corporate control transitions in large firms is double 
that in small firms (t-statistic for the average meeting frequency for corporate control 
transactions in small firms minus that in large firms is significant at the 1% level). Meetings 
about changes in equity structure are most frequent in small firms; meetings to discuss 
financial reports and audits do not alter with firm size. 
 Panel D of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and annual meeting frequencies for 
all eleven topics, based on the CSMAR database. It provides more detailed statistics for the 
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original dataset. How these eleven topics have been grouped into six major topics in our 
estimation was reported in Table 1. Meetings of related-party transactions (M4) and loan 
guarantees (M5) comprise most of the meetings discussing corporate control transactions, 
approximately 1.2 and 0.5 meetings per year. Audit changes (M7), ownership changes (M8) 
and disposal of assets (M10) are not discussed frequently in board meetings in China (less 
than 0.1 times per year). 
 Firm performance measures. Our primary measure of firm performance is ROA. Table 4 
shows that the average ROA is about 3.9%, which is consistent with prior research (Conyon 
and He, 2011, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006a). We also use two other accounting performance 
measures in robustness tests, return on equity (ROE) and profit margin (sales profit/sales 
income). Although market-based SHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUHVLHVWRFNUHWXUQVDQG7RELQ¶V4DUH
widely used in developed markets, they are not considered an appropriate performance 
measure for Chinese listed firms. Most Chinese listed firms are SOEs, the majority of whose 
shares are not tradable in the secondary market. The holders of non-tradable shares, mainly 
governments or state-owned legal persons, typically acquire their shares at prices 
significantly lower than the initial public offering prices. Since there are big pricing gaps 
between tradable and non-tradable shares, Tobin¶s Q would not correctly reflect firmV¶ 
financial performance or value. In addition, the Chinese stock markets are highly speculative, 
and share prices bear little relationship to their fundamental values (Bai et al, 2004; Lin et al, 
2014). In our regression, we use the industry-adjusted return on assets WKDWLVWKHILUP¶s ROA 
minus the average ROA in the same industry, following the literature (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). We also employ firms¶UDZ52$LQWKHUHJUHssions, and 
the results are unaltered (available upon request). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Control variables. Following the recent corporate board literature (Conyon and He, 2011; 
You and Du, 2012), we group the vector of control variables into three categories: board 
features, ownership variables, and firm characteristics. Table 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics for these variables. The category of board feature variables contains the percentage 
of independent directors on a board (Independent directors %), the natural log of the number 
of board directors (Board size), and a dummy variable for whether the CEO also chairs the 
board (Duality). The group of ownership structure variables includes shares held by the 
largest shareholders (Largest shareholding), the Herfindahl index, which is the sum of 
squares of the shareholding percentages of the top five shareholders (Ownership 
concentration), and an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is controlled by a 
parent SOE or government agent (State-owned enterprises). To control for firm 
characteristics, we include the natural log of a firm¶V total assets (Log(firm size)), the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees (Log(employees)), and the book value of debt divided 
by total assets (Leverage). We also control for CEO age (Age) and gender (Female) in the 
estimations of CEO dismissal. A set of year dummies are included to control for macro-
economic shocks, while industry dummies account for industry-specific factors.3  
 About 66% of the listed companies in our sample are State-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
average number of board members is 9.19, of whom independent directors make up 37% (the 
legal requirement since 2003has been one third). About 14% of firms have a CEO with a dual 
                                                 
3
 Industry dummies are included because listed firms may change main business sectors during the sample 
period. The untabulated coefficients of the industry dummies prove the existence of within-group variance for 
most industries. 
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leadership role. The pairwise correlations between the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
There are only modest correlations among the independent variables. The values of the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.02 to 1.86, and all the values are strictly less 
than 3, indicating that the regression analysis is not likely to have multicollinearity problems. 
The distributions of the other variables are largely consistent with those reported in prior 
studies. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
 To examine the impact of topic-specific meetings on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to 
firm performance, we estimate six series of panel data logistic regressions with fixed effects, 
for firm i in year t: 
 ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺܦ݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݂ሺܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵǡ ܶ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵǡ  ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵ ൈ ܶ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵǡ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵሻ (1) 
 To test the effect of topic-specific meetings on the correlation between compensation and 
performance, we estimate six series of linear regression models using fixed effects: ܥ݋݉݌݁݊ݏܽݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵǡ ܶ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵǡ  ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵ ൈ ܶ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵǡ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵሻ(2) 
A fixed effects estimator can help to control the heteroscedasticity caused by unobserved 
firm-specific influences or measuring errors in regressions. In order to examine whether the 
holding of topic-specific meetings has an impact on performance-related CEO dismissal and 
compensation, we include interaction effects of the frequencies of meetings on the six major 
topics, individually. In other words, for each type of meeting, we include ݐ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵ  and the interaction term ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵ ൈ
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ݐ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵ in the regression models. The use of interaction 
terms is common in economics and finance research (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Kato and Long, 
2006b; Weisbach, 1988; You and Du, 2012). A positive value for the effect of the interaction 
term in the compensation models would imply that, the higher the frequency with which 
topics were discussed at board meetings, the greater the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
performance. In the CEO dismissal models, a negative value for the effect of the interaction 
would indicate that, the more a certain topic was discussed at board meetings, the greater 
would be the CEO dismissal-to-performance sensitivity. To provide robust evidence, we also 
measure meeting frequency using an indicator for each topic, topic-specific meeting dummy, 
which equals one if the meeting frequency is above the median of the distribution within the 
same year, and zero otherwise.  
 We can also partly mitigate the endogeneity issue by using lagged values of all 
independent variables to facilitate causality. Further consideration of endogeneity issues is 
provided in robustness checks where we implement dynamic panel GMM regressions. 
 
5. Do Topic-Specific Board Meetings Affect Quality of Corporate Governance? 
 
5.1 CEO Dismissal, Firm Performance, and Topic-Specific Board Meetings 
 
 In this section, we examine whether the frequency of topic-specific board meetings affects 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable is set to one if the CEO has 
been dismissed and zero otherwise. Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regressions 
with fixed effects based on equation (1), with firm performance measured using industry-
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adjusted ROA.4 The topic-specific meeting variables for each of the six topics are defined as 
(1) the annual meeting frequency and (2) a topic-specific meeting dummy, indicating whether 
the annual meeting frequency is above the median for the distribution within the same year. 
Columns (A) to (F) show the estimation results for each board meeting topic. For instance, 
Column (A)±(1) presents the regression results obtained using the number of nomination-
related meetings, while Column (A)-(2) presents those obtained using the topic-specific 
meeting dummy for nomination-related meetings. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 5 shows that CEO dismissal and firm performance are negatively associated after 
controlling for firm-level governance and characteristics.5 This indicates that the more poorly 
a firm is performing, the more likely the CEO is to be dismissed by the board, consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009; Conyon and He, 2012; Kato and Long, 
2006b).  
 To test and evaluate the effects of topic-specific meetings on turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we introduce two variables, namely ݐ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵ 
and an interaction term, ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ିଵ ൈ ݐ݋݌݅ܿ݂݋ܿݑݏ݁݀݉݁݁ݐ݅݊݃݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ିଵ . 
The coefficients on meeting frequency for Nomination (A), Compensation (B), and Growth 
strategies (F) are negative and statistically significant, which indicates that firms with more 
meetings related to nominations, compensation, or growth strategies have lower likelihood of 
                                                 
4
 We also estimate equation (1) using random effects, and the main results are consistent with those obtained 
using fixed effects. The results of a Hausman test indicate that the firm-fixed-effects models in our study are 
more suitable.  
5
 :H XVH VWRFN UHWXUQV DQG 7RELQ¶V 4 DV SHUIRUPDQFH PHDVXUHV DQG ILQG WKDW PDUNHW SHUIRUPDQFH SOD\V D
limited role in explaining the probability of CEO dismissal or the size of compensation, which is consistent with 
the finding of Conyon and He (2014). 
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dismissing their CEOs. In contrast, the coefficients of (C) Financial reports and audit are 
positively significant, which implies that firms with more meetings discussing financial 
reports, auditor switches and changes of audit opinion are more likely to fire their CEOs. The 
amendment of financial reports and changes of auditor opinion are probably related to poor 
firm performance and corporate governance problems. Meetings on these topics will help 
directors to identify weaknesses in firm performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), which could 
put more pressure on a firm to fire its CEO. 
 For nomination meetings (A), where boards discuss personnel changes involving directors, 
the CEO, and top management, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive. 
This result suggests that the existence of board nomination meetings reduces the sensitivity of 
forced CEO dismissal to firm performance. Other board meeting topics are unlikely to affect 
the dismissal-performance relationship. The coefficients of the interaction terms have 
different signs and vary greatly in magnitude, indicating that the influence of different types 
of meetings on CEO-performance sensitivities differ, although most are not significant. Out 
of all six major types of meeting topic, we find no monitoring activities that increase the 
negative relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance. It suggests that boards 
of directors in China are not effective at dismissing poorly performing CEOs through their 
monitoring of corporate decisions. Our findings reflect the difficulties boards of directors 
have dismissing their CEOs in China (Allen et al., 2005; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006b). 
Furthermore, we explore whether the effects of nomination meetings on CEO dismissal-
performance sensitivity differs under different ownership structures in Section 5.3. 
 CEO/chairman duality has negative effects on the probability of CEO dismissal, consistent 
with the findings of Goyal and Park (2002). Larger firms have a lower probability of forcibly 
dismissing their CEO. The coefficients of the percentage of independent directors are not 
significant, which is consistent with the findings of Kato and Long (2006a). 
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 CEO dismissal may not happen suddenly, but due to unsatisfactory long-term performance. 
Thus, we also explore whether board meetings (or accumulated meetings over period of time) 
have an effect on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm long-term performance. We 
estimate a fixed effect logit model linking CEO dismissal and long-term performance. The 
latter is defined as the accumulated industry-adjusted ROA from year t-3 to t-1 following 
Kim (1996), which is then interacted with board meetings in year t-1 for each topic (or with 
accumulated board meetings from year t-3 to t-1). The hypothesis is that the probability of 
CEO dismissal is more sensitive to long-term performance when there are more board 
meetings. Appendix C reports the estimation results. Panel A (Panel B) of Appendix C shows 
the results using accumulated ROAt-1 and its interactions with topic-specific meeting 
frequency (with accumulated topic-specific meeting frequency). All interactions are 
insignificant, so the results do not support this assertion. 6  The evidence suggests that, 
although CEO dismissal is negatively related to long-term performance, board activities or 
accumulated board activities do not influence the relation between CEO dismissal and long-
term performance.  
 Overall, our results imply that different types of board meetings may affect CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity differently. Interestingly, the existence of board nomination meetings 
lessens the sensitivity of CEO dismissals to performance.  
 
5.2 Compensation, Firm Performance, and Topic-specific Board Meetings 
                                                 
6
 To obtain robust results, we also regress CEO dismissal on ROA, topic-specific meetings and their 
interactions from t-3 to t-1, and we find that the interactions from t-3 to t-1 are not significant for six types 
of meetings (Panel C).  The joint significance test shows that CEO dismissal is negatively related to the 
long-term effect of ROA, but the long-term effects of interactions between meeting and ROA are not 
significant. The results are similar with those using accumulated industry adjusted ROA. These results 
should be treated carefully since the insignificant relationship could be caused by the smaller sample size. 
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 Table 6A reports panel data estimates from equation (2) with fixed effects in which we 
examine the effects of topic-specific board meetings on the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in China. Columns (A) to (F) represent the estimation 
results for each board meeting topic. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6A about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 6A illustrates that there is a positive relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance, suggesting WKDW D&(2¶VSD\ LV generally higher in firms with good 
performance. Our results coincide with prior research (Conyon and He, 2012; Firth et al., 
2006). The implication is that firm profitability is an important component of CEOs¶
compensation contracting in the Chinese market. 
 Executive compensation is positively related to meeting frequencies on the topics of 
Nomination (A) and Compensation (B). This implies these meetings are likely to be used by 
CEOs to increase their compensation level, while the boards of directors do not seem able to 
challenge their CEOs¶GHPDQGs for high payments at meetings. As for the interaction terms, 
the coefficient of ROA interacted with the frequency of meetings on growth strategy is 
positive and significant. This means CEO pay-performance sensitivity is higher when a firm 
has more meetings on growth strategies, which is consistent with our conjectures about the 
role of growth-strategy meetings. Meetings on growth strategies enable boards of directors to 
re-evaluate CEO capability and firm fundamentals in depth, and to reward CEO efforts 
towards enhancing firm performance (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser, 2008). 
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between nomination meeting frequency and 
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ROA is significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive compensation 
DQG D ILUP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV OLNHO\ WR be weakened by such meetings. Lastly, none of the 
interactions between other meeting topics and firm performance is statistically significant.  
 Board size tends to have a positive effect on CEO compensation, as do the existence of a 
major shareholder, and firm size, which is consistent with Cao et al. (2011). Firms with state-
controlled shareholders and higher levels of debt have lower levels of CEO compensation. 
 In the executive pay-setting process, companies probably employ several key firm 
characteristics to select benchmarks for peer-group comparisons in the US market (Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen, 2011; Coles, Wang, and Li, 2018). Thus, we further construct another 
proxy for excess compensation, Excess Compensation, which is obtained using the residual from 
the regression of CEO compensation on other firm characteristics (size, performance, board size, 
board independence and ownership concentration) within the same industry and year.7 Table 6B 
displays the results of the regression of Excess Compensation on board meetings and meeting-
performance interactions. The main results are consistent with others using industry-adjusted 
compensation.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6B about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
7
 To obtain Excess Compensation, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for each industry 
classification within the fiscal year from 2005 to 2015: Compensation
 jt =  Log(firm size) jt+  ROA jt +Board 
size
 jt +  Independent director % jt +  Ownership Concentration jt +  Hjt.. The firm-specific annual excess 
compensation for firm j (in a given industry) in year t, Hjt, is the residual of the regression of the above equation 
for that particular industry. 
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 Overall, the results signify that more meetings discussing ILUPV¶PHUJHUVDQGDFTXLVLWLRQV
and the use of IPO proceeds would improve the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance. In contrast, board nomination meetings weaken this relationship. 
 
5.3 The Impact of Topic-Specific Board Meetings and Corporate Ownership in China 
 
 Chinese listed firms often have controlling shareholders who can nominate/appoint their 
preferred agents to the board and use their power to benefit themselves, sometimes at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Real control of the firm often lies with either the state or 
non-state controlling shareholders, who often have different goals from other shareholders, 
potentially having a huge impact on management motivations and actions. State owners such 
as SOEs or government agents have political, social, and economic goals (Allen et al., 2005). 
Non-state controlling owners have a strong incentive to maximize firm value for their own 
interests, but they may also expropriate the income and assets of the listed firm away from 
the minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-SIlanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). This 
differs from governance mechanisms in the US. We focus our examinations of nomination 
and growth-strategy meetings on two subsamples: state-controlled and non-state-controlled 
firms respectively.  
 The state-controlled firm subsample contains firms with state controlling shareholders, 
while the non-state-controlled firm subsample consists of firms with non-state controlling 
shareholders. Panel A of Table 7 presents estimation results for the effects of nomination 
meetings in the state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms respectively. For the CEO 
dismissal estimations, the interaction term ROA
 t-1 ×  Nomination meeting frequency t-1 is only 
significant in the non-state-controlled firm subsample. The sign of the interaction term in this 
subsample is positive (Column (2)), which contradicts the negative sign of the ROA effect on 
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CEO dismissal. Thus, board meetings on nominations decrease the sensitivity of CEO 
dismissal to performance in non-state-controlled firms.  
 For the CEO compensation estimation, the sign of the interaction term in the subsample of 
non-state-controlled firms is negative (Column (4) in Table 7 Panel A). This implies that 
nomination-related board meetings also weaken the relationship between CEO compensation 
and performance in non-state-controlled firms. In contrast, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms in the subsample of state-controlled firms are not significant (Column (3) in Table 7 
Panel A). Therefore, we find that nomination-related meetings lessen the quality of corporate 
governance in non-state-controlled firms, but not in state-controlled firms. These findings 
suggest that, in privately controlled corporations, CEOs may have more power and may tend 
to appoint people who will conflict with them less, whereas CEOs in state-controlled firms 
may be less likely to manipulate personnel selection so as to entrench themselves through 
board meetings. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Panel B of Table 7 shows estimation results for the effects of growth-strategy meetings in 
state-controlled firms and non-state-controlled firms respectively. In both subsamples, the 
interaction terms ROA ×  Growth strategy meetings are significantly and positively related to 
CEO compensation, and these signs are the same as those for firm performance (Column (1) 
and Column (2) in in Table 7 Panel B). This suggests that growth-strategy meetings enhance 
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the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance, regardless of ownership structure. 
Overall, we find that a higher frequency of meetings on growth strategies enhances the 
quality of corporate governance in terms of improving CEO compensation-performance 
sensitivity.   
 
5.4 Endogeneity Problem and Persistence 
We use the GMM method to reduce endogeneity concerns regarding board meetings, CEO 
dismissal/compensation and performance. These endogeneity concerns include unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic relation between board meetings and past firm 
performance concerns. Our endogenous variables are topic-specific board meetings, firm 
performance and their interaction terms. 
 ,QLWLDOO\ ZH SHUIRUP WKH µGLIIHUHQFH-in-Sargan-VWDWLVWLF¶ WHVW WR H[DPLQH ZKHWKHU WRSLF- 
specific meetings are endogenous in our models. If topic-specific meetings are diagnosed as 
being exogenous variables, there will be no need to estimate the models using the GMM 
method. In the CEO dismissal regressions, the F-VWDWLVWLFV RI WKH µGLIIHUHQFH-in-Sargan-
VWDWLVWLF¶WHVWDUHLQVLJQLILFDQWLQDOOFDVHVPHDQLQJWRSLF-specific meeting frequency can be 
treated as exogenous in the CEO dismissal model. However, topic-specific meetings should 
be treated as endogenous in the compensation model, based on the results of the µdifference-
in-Sargan-statistic¶WHVW 
Following recent work (Conyon and He, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012), we use the dynamic 
panel data GMM estimator to estimate the compensation-performance model. Topic-specific 
meetings, performance and their interactions, and all of the firm-specific control variables are 
assumed to be potentially endogenous. One-year lagged compensation is also included in the 
main regression. We used up to five years of lagged dependent and endogenous variables as 
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instruments in both level and difference equations. To check validity of the instrumental 
variables, Hansen over-identification, AR(1), and AR(2) tests are reported in Appendix D. 
 Appendix D demonstrates that Compensation is significantly related to ROA. The 
interaction term between nomination meetings and ROA (Column (A) of Appendix D) is still 
negatively significant, while the interaction term between growth-strategy meetings and ROA 
is positive (Column (F) of Appendix D). The GMM estimates are similar to our earlier 
findings. In addition, the lagged compensation (i.e. the lagged dependent variable) is positive 
and significant in each of the regressions. This indicates that CEO compensation is highly 
persistent and takes time to adjust to its long-run equilibrium, with consist with the finding of 
Conyon and He (2012).  
 
5.5 The informativeness of issuing topic.  
 The content of reports may reveal useful information to stakeholders. Importantly, some 
reports may be exhaustive, while others may be brief. The more detailed reports can also 
represent greater oversight of meetings by directors. Approximate 40% of reports in the 
dataset includes multiple topics. The narratives of topics in multiple-topic reports are 
overlapping. For example, the open and ending wordings of reports could make up to one 
third RI WKH WRWDO ZRUGV VXFK DV ³DFFRUGLQJ WR 3ULQFLSOH ;; LQ &RPSDQ\ /DZ««´  ,W
causes the difficulty to obtain an ideal proxy for the number of words for each topic.  
 Panel A in Appendix E shows the average words of each topic based on reports with only 
one topic covered. The average number of words is around 250 for the topic of nomination 
and the topic of financial reports and audit, and the number of words is around 350 for the 
other four topics. It may suggest that directors disclose less information on nomination and 
financial report meetings. We however cannot rule out the probability that the word 
difference is due to relative simplicity of nomination and financial report and audit topic. 
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 Considering the difficulty to differentiate/isolate the number of words for each topic in 
multiple-topic reports and the variations in number of words for each topic among firms and 
years, for each firm-year, we use the number of words of any single topic report to proxy for 
the number of words of that topic across all reports (single-topic and multiple-topic). We 
regress CEO dismissal and compensation module with the number of words substituting the 
frequency of meetings for each topic. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Panel B and C 
of Appendix E report the regression results. The interaction between words of nomination 
meetings and ROA is positively (negatively) significant in CEO dismissal model (CEO 
compensation model). Also the interaction between words of firm growth meetings and ROA 
is positively significant in CEO compensation model. These results are similar to our main 
regression results in Table 5 and Table 6. It should be aware that this method could suffer 
sample selection bias, i.e. excluding firm year observations without single-topic reports.
 %HVLGHV WKHQXPEHURI ZRUGV WKH FRQWHQWRI WRSLFVPD\ UHYHDO GLUHFWRU¶VRSLQLRQDERXW
corporate decisions. We notice that only less than 2% of reports denote strong negative 
RSLQLRQV DJDLQVW PDQDJHPHQW RU FRQWUROOLQJ VKDUHKROGHU¶V SURSRVDOV :H VXSSRVH directors 
may reveal some information in the positive reports, so the tone of reports using textual 
analysis may be used as the direction. Because there is no widely accepted financial word 
dictionary for Chinese language, it is not easy to get a reliable tone measure to proxy for the 
direction of reports. Also for reports that have multiple topics, GLUHFWRU¶V RSLQLRQV RQ WKH
meeting are often overlapped, so we cannot obtain the tone of each topic. Ignoring the tone 
may underestimate the efforts of board in corporate decisions.  
 
 
5.6 Additional Checks 
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 5.6.1 Alternative measures of CEO dismissal and compensation. Our CEO dismissal 
measure is based on available public information (on forced or unforced dismissals). 
However, using public information to classify CEO dismissals may be problematic. 
Following previous research (e.g. Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b), we 
employ a binary variable that equals one for any type of CEO personnel change, regardless of 
the reason for the dismissal. We re-estimate the logit equation (1) using this new definition of 
CEO dismissal as the dependent variable. Our results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained using forced CEO dismissal. 
 We also use the individual-level CEO payment data available from the year 2005 as a 
robustness check. Approximately 40% of CEOs did not receive any compensation from the 
listed firms during the period in question. These CEOs are likely to have received their 
salaries from the parent company, or to have held a large proportion of shares. The sample 
includes 3,454 listed-firm-year observations over the period 2005-2010. The untabulated 
results based on the individual data are similar to those based on aggregate compensation. 
The coefficient on the interaction term (nomination meeting frequency ൈ  ROA) is 
significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive compensation and a 
firm¶V accounting performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. Unreported results 
for ROE and the profit margin are similar to those for ROA. 
 
 5.6.2 Eleven meeting topics recorded in the CSMAR database. In order to test whether our 
results are affected by our grouping of meeting topics, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) 
using meeting frequencies for eleven topics recorded in the CSMAR database (see Column 1 
of Table 1). Except for meetings on nominations, the interactions are found not to be 
significant for CEO dismissal and performance sensitivity. Regarding CEO compensation 
sensitivity to firm performance, the interactions between meetings on mergers and 
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acquisitions (6) and on the use of IPO proceeds (9) and firm performance are positively 
significant, while the other interactions are not significant. Meetings on mergers and 
acquisitions (6) and the use of IPO proceeds (9) were combined into meetings on growth 
strategies in the main analysis. Therefore, the unreported results for the eleven meeting topics 
are consistent with our main analysis based on the six major topics. 
 
 5.6.3 China-specific control variables. As our study is based on Chinese listed firms, we 
further add more control variables so as to consider the special institutional and economic 
environment in China. Stemming from the introduction of the US board system to China in 
2001, the supervisory board of directors still exists there. Thus, we add the size of the 
supervisory board to control for the potential effect of monitoring from supervisors (Ding et 
al, 2010). Regarding the regional imbalances in economic growth, we add the Chinese 
government transparency index (or regional dummies) accordingly. Our key results remain 
unaltered after we consider these characteristics of the Chinese market. 
   
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a better understanding of how board activity affects 
board effectiveness in linking CEO compensation/dismissal to firm performance. In our 
empirical examination, to measure board activity we move beyond the mere frequency of 
board meetings and target their agendas. We exploit a unique dataset on board meeting 
agendas of Chinese listed firms over the period 2005-2015, and show that there are six major 
meeting topics: PDQDJHPHQW DQG GLUHFWRUV¶ QRPLQDWLRQV, their compensation, management 
routines, firm control transactions, changes in equity structure, and growth strategies.  
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 To provide evidence of board effectiveness in China, we examine the influences of topic-
specific meetings on the relationship between CEO-dismissal and performance, and on that 
between CEO-compensation and performance. The rationale behind this is that discussing 
certain topics could enhance the informativeness of the board, thus helping directors to assess 
and monitor CEOs, and thereby strengthen these relationships (in other words, improve 
internal corporate governance). 
 Our results reveal that CEO dismissal is significantly negatively, and compensation 
positively, correlated to all of the accounting-based performance measures. Hence, DILUP¶V
profitability is WKHPDLQFULWHULRQXVHGWRHYDOXDWHWKH&(2¶VSHUIRUPDQFH in China. We also 
find that the frequencies of meetings on major topics are diverse, as are the roles of such 
meetings in monitoring the top management. In particular, the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to performance is stronger when there are more board meetings on growth 
strategies, such as mergers and acquisitions and applying IPO proceeds. When directors 
discuss firm growth strategies, they could obtain comprehensive information about firm 
performance, CEO capability, and future strategies. Our results suggest the soft information 
FDSWXUHG LQ ERDUG PHHWLQJV LV OLNHO\ WR LQIOXHQFH GLUHFWRUV¶ HYDOXDWLRQV RI the CEO¶V 
capability, leading them to change the CEO¶V compensation scheme accordingly, so as to 
motivate the CEO and other managers. Meanwhile, most of the major topics of board 
meetings are not likely to affect the sensitivity between CEO turnover and performance. In 
fact, meetings on nominations could even reduce both turnover-performance and pay-
performance sensitivity.  
 In China, the majority of listed firms have dominant state shareholders or non-state 
shareholders. These two types of shareholders have distinct goals, which may influence 
managerial incentives, and the selection and activities of board members. Using subsample 
analyses, we find that board meetings on growth strategies could enhance CEO 
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compensation-performance sensitivity in both types of firms. However, meetings on 
nominations reduce both turnover-performance and pay-performance sensitivity in firms 
controlled by dominant non-state shareholders. 
 While our results are consistent with different effects of director monitoring activities on 
the quality of corporate governance, we acknowledge that there are limitations to this study. 
2XUPHDVXUHIRUGLUHFWRU¶VHIIRUWEDVHGRQERDUGPHHWLQJDFWLYLWLHVRQGLIIHUHQWWRSLFVcould 
be more accurate. Besides our discussion on the number of words in the reports, the direction 
about message provided by reports could reveal more information about board efforts on 
corporate decisions.  
 Despite these limitations, the findings of our study suggest there are differences in the 
effects of meeting topic on CEO pay/dismissal-to-performance sensitivities, and highlight the 
need for more tailored approaches to board requirements. In the countries that carry out good 
µFRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH JXLGDQFH¶ SROLcies, UHJXODWRUV¶ DJHQGDV stay concentrated on board 
composition and structure, and the total number of annual meetings, as the means to allow 
boards to best perform their duties. A sound board structure following such guidance alone, 
however, does not µPDNH JUHDW ERDUGV JUHDW¶ (Sonnenfeld, 2002). To a certain degree, our 
study reflects the complexities involved in the board decision-making process. Thus, it calls 
for a reconsideration of the current one-size-fits-all approach taken by the regulators. 
Particularly in China, the regulators should consider introducing regulations to prevent 
potentially self-interested behaviour from the CEO and non-state controlling shareholders 
when making nominations and personnel changes to the directors and top management. 
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TABLE 1 Specific topics of board meetings in Chinese public firms 
This table reports the specific major topics discussed in the board meetings of Chinese listed firms. The eleven categories (by CSMAR code) of meetings are 
based on the Code of Corporate Governance in China (2001). We combine some topics as they have similar effects. 
 
  
CSMAR code  
(According to CSRC requirements) 
Major topics  Notes 
Personnel ± 1 Nomination (A)  Director and officer selection, appointment, and turnover 
Compensation - 2 Compensation (B)  Emolument of directors and executives 
Financial report and pay out policies - 3 
Audit - 7 
Financial reports and audit (C)  Approval of financial reports, profit distribution, 
amendments and supplements of reports, etc.; switches 
of auditors, audit opinion; accounting treatment and 
information disclosure 
Related-party transactions - 4 
Loans Guarantees - 5 
Disposal of assets - 10 
Corporate control transactions 
(D) 
 Loan guarantees are promises by the listed firm (the 
guarantor) to assume the debt obligation of a borrower if 
that borrower defaults; disposal of assets means the gain 
or loss calculated as the net disposal proceeds, minus the 
DVVHW¶VFDUU\LQJYDOXH 
Ownership changes - 8 
Split share structure reform ± 11 
 
Change of equity structure (E)   
 
Mergers and acquisitions - 6 
Use of IPO proceeds and financing - 9 
Growth strategies (F)   
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TABLE 2 Sample distribution and descriptive statistics for six types of meetings across industries  
    
(A) 
Nomination 
(B) 
Compensation 
(C) Financial 
reports and audit 
(D) Corporate 
control 
transactions 
(E) Change of 
equity structure 
(F) Growth 
strategies 
 
Firms % Obs Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
A 37 2.05 290 0.945 1.230 0.134 0.415 0.314 0.553 1.362 1.542 0.103 0.376 0.469 1.069 
B 70 3.88 446 1.018 1.342 0.215 0.556 0.453 0.698 2.085 2.300 0.043 0.233 0.390 0.821 
C 903 50.00 8,180 0.919 1.261 0.240 0.665 0.421 0.680 1.778 1.993 0.120 0.432 0.374 0.878 
D 92 5.09 733 1.063 1.310 0.205 0.498 0.419 0.655 2.064 2.224 0.116 0.420 0.319 0.733 
E 50 2.77 343 0.819 1.130 0.289 0.799 0.399 0.593 1.956 2.609 0.102 0.424 0.359 0.778 
F 165 9.14 1,156 0.966 1.234 0.234 0.651 0.416 0.629 1.559 1.857 0.103 0.398 0.283 0.706 
G 83 4.60 716 0.997 1.326 0.187 0.483 0.297 0.581 1.647 1.888 0.073 0.335 0.228 0.619 
H 11 0.61 96 1.344 1.672 0.115 0.380 0.688 0.685 1.896 1.462 0.125 0.391 0.469 0.962 
I 62 3.43 409 0.951 1.346 0.386 0.920 0.408 0.662 1.257 1.648 0.132 0.440 0.340 0.863 
J 159 8.80 1,101 1.018 1.252 0.291 0.755 0.480 0.697 1.917 2.323 0.079 0.333 0.262 0.848 
K 24 1.33 155 0.929 1.249 0.174 0.444 0.426 0.654 1.394 1.753 0.148 0.532 0.374 0.815 
L 31 1.72 122 0.984 1.178 0.385 0.922 0.672 0.886 1.508 1.750 0.172 0.585 0.484 0.998 
M 24 1.33 115 1.261 1.481 0.365 0.753 0.626 0.789 1.896 1.739 0.026 0.208 0.835 1.249 
N 95 5.26 497 0.710 1.129 0.177 0.509 0.374 0.626 1.262 1.598 0.193 0.542 0.165 0.476 
Total 1,806 100 14,359 
            
The table shows the distribution of sample firms in 2005-2015 across industries based on the Guidance on the Industry Category of Listed Companies issued 
by the CSRC (2012 version). A = Agriculture, B = Mining, C = Manufacturing, D = Electricityɾ gas and water, E = Building and construction, F = 
Wholesale and retail trade, G = transportation and logistics, H = Accommodation and Catering Industry, I = Information technology, J = Real estate, K = 
Commerce, L = Water, environment and public facilities management, M = Culture, sports and entertainment, N = Synthesis. 
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TABLE 3 CEO dismissal, compensation and board meetings 
 
Panel A: Annual CEO dismissal rate, executive compensation and board meeting frequency 
 
Panel C: The differences of topic focused meeting frequencies between groups based on firm size 
  Small firms (S) Median firms (M) Large firms (L) Two sample mean t-test 
 
Obs. = 4,738 Obs. = 4,737  Obs. = 4,882 Diff (S ± M) Diff (M ± L)  Diff (S ± L) 
  Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std t statistics t statistics t statistics 
(A) Nomination 0.849 1.222 0.928 1.223 1.046 1.342  -3.165 ***  -4.474 ***   -7.515*** 
(B) Compensation 0.129 0.438 0.245 0.653 0.342 0.804  -10.199 ***   -6.472 ***  -16.092 *** 
(C) Financial reports and audit 0.423 0.683 0.413 0.657 0.424 0.667 0.747 -0.836 -0.074 
(D) Corporate control transactions 1.228 1.464 1.727 1.821 2.26 2.465  -14.700 ***  -12.025 ***   -24.868 *** 
(E) Change of equity structure 0.170 0.505 0.118 0.43 0.052 0.282 5.378 *** 8.867 ***  14.136 *** 
(F) Growth strategies 0.171 0.562 0.393 0.888 0.471 0.978  -14.537 ***  -4.092 ***  -18.376 *** 
(continued on next page) 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Obs. 1,245 1,272 1,247 1,249 1,255 1,307 1,334 1,354 1,352 1,367 1,368 14,359 
CEO dismissal rate 0.189 0.189 0.167 0.166 0.163 0.176 0.164 0.14 0.182 0.2 0.219 0.178 
Compensation (RMB 000s) 230.904 259.874 357.544 397.479 440.288 524.065 598.143 637.598 684.047 738.408 802.093 528.059 
Annual meeting frequency 7.504 8.227 9.874 9.768 8.712 9.01 9.388 9.806 9.158 9.703 10.711 9.277 
 
Panel B: Meeting frequencies on major topics        
Observations = 14,359 Mean Median Std 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(A) Nomination 0.942 0.000 1.267 397 450 512 695 687 1169 1223 1312 1716 2061 2305 
(B) Compensation 0.240 0.000 0.656 96 45 35 103 95 255 316 344 548 688 915 
(C) Financial reports and audit 0.420 0.000 0.669 355 296 186 147 232 369 374 643 808 1202 1418 
(D) Corporate control transactions 1.743 1.000 2.011 1381 1337 1531 1815 1834 2293 2142 2818 3138 3240 3502 
(E) Change of equity structure 0.113 0.000 0.418 180 1055 121 63 58 37 11 38 20 8 26 
(F) Growth strategies 0.346 0.000 0.840 119 106 147 209 294 303 474 466 696 817 1342 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Meeting frequencies on all eleven topics in CSMAR database 
Type of meeting Mean Median Std 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
M1 0.942 0.000 1.267  397   450   512   695   687   1,169   1,223   1,312   1,716   2,061   2,305  
M2 0.240 0.000 0.656  96   45   35   103   95   255   316   344   548   688   915  
M3 0.383 0.000 0.620  337   211   112   130   192   326   331   606   755   1,136   1,365  
M4 1.150 1.000 1.394  1,054   966   1,120   1,435   1,154   1,589   1,381   1,866   1,988   1,957   1,999  
M5 0.478 0.000 1.128  235   321   352   347   601   564   635   815   872   959   1,168  
M6 0.117 0.000 0.431  64   57   93   89   133   107   166   176   176   190   424  
M7 0.037 0.000 0.203  18   85   74   17   40   43   43   37   53   66   53  
M8 0.032 0.000 0.205  179   54   38   19   43   36   9   35   16   8   26  
M9 0.230 0.000 0.686  55   49   54   120   161   196   308   290   520   627   918  
M10 0.115 0.000 0.400  92   50   59   33   79   140   126   137   278   324   335  
M11 0.080 0.000 0.361  1   1,001   83   44   15   1   2   3   4   0 0    
This table reports the rate of CEO dismissal, the executive compensation (the average of the three highest-SDLGH[HFXWLYHV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQWKHDQQXDOQXPEHU
of board meetings, and the frequencies of board meetings on major topics, in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2015. In panel A, the CEO dismissal rate 
refers to the percentage of CEO dismissals in the single year. Executive compensation (000s RMB) is the average compensation of the three highest-paid 
executives and directors, including basic salary, bonuses, and other benefits. Annual number of board meetings expresses the average frequency of board 
meetings. Panel B shows the frequencies of meetings on the six major topics individually: nomination (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), 
corporate control transactions (D), change of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F). Panel C illustrates that topic-specific meeting frequencies vary 
with firm size. Firm year observations have been grouped into small firms (S-the lower third of the distribution), median firms (M-the median third) and large 
firms (L-the higher third). T- statistics (two-tailed test) for differences between groups are reported. Panel D demonstrates the frequencies of meetings on 
original 11 topics in CSMAR database individually, where M1 = Personnel, M2 = Compensation, M3 = Financial report and pay out policies, M4 = Related-
party transactions, M5 = Loans Guarantees, M6 = Disposal of assets, M7 = Audit, M8 = Ownership changes, M9 = Use of IPO proceeds and financing, M10 
= Disposal of assets, M11 = Split share structure reform. 
.  
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TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics for main variables 
  Definition Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 N 
ROA Net profit divided by total assets 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14,359 
Industry adjusted ROA 7KHILUP¶52$PLQXVWKHPHDQRI52$LQWKHVDPHLQGXVWU\ 0.000 0.002 0.057 -0.017 0.025 14,359 
Age CEO age 51.515 51.000 6.999 47.000 56.000 12,490 
Female A dummy variable equals one if CEO is female 0.036 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 14,359 
Board size Logarithm of number of directors 9.194 9.000 1.928 8.000 10.000 14,246 
Duality An indicator equals one if the same person acts as CEO and 
chairman, and zero otherwise 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.000 13,645 
Independent directors % Fraction of independent directors on board 0.365 0.333 0.053 0.333 0.375 14,246 
Largest shareholding% Shares held by largest shareholders 31.692 29.445 17.625 17.718 44.050 13,577 
State-owned enterprises Dummy equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or government agencies, and zero otherwise 0.656 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 14,359 
Ownership Concentration Herfindahl_index - Sum of squares of shareholding percentage of top five shareholders 0.175 0.141 0.128 0.073 0.252 14,359 
Leverage Total liability over total assets 21.983 21.870 1.410 21.032 22.804 14,359 
Log(firm size) /RJYDOXHRIILUP¶VWRWDODVVHWV 7.614 7.690 1.527 6.774 8.559 14,315 
Log(employees) Logarithm of number of employees in the firm 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14,359 
Industry adjusted compensation 7KHILUP¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQPLQXVWKHDYHUDJHRIFRPSHQVDWLRQLQWKH
same industry based on CSRC industry code in the fiscal year 0.000 0.015 0.747 -0.463 0.463 14,294 
Excess Compensation 
The residual from the regression of CEO compensation on more 
firm characteristics (e.g. size, performance) within the same 
industry and year (see details in Footnote 7) 
0.000 0.0270 0.668 -0.415 0.418 14,140 
The table provides definitions and descriptive statistics for the main variables. The sample contains firm-years from 2005 to 2015.  
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TABEL 5 The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm performance 
CEO dismissal (A) Nomination (B) Compensation (C) Financial reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate control 
transactions 
(E) Change of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth strategies 
 Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
ROA
 t-1 -3.277*** -3.419*** -2.400*** -2.301*** -2.408*** -2.410*** -2.133*** -2.426*** -2.603*** -2.655*** -2.694*** -2.735*** 
 
(0.709) (0.712) (0.621) (0.626) (0.679) (0.667) (0.763) (0.704) (0.617) (0.615) (0.627) (0.636) 
Topic-focused  -0.180*** -0.291*** -0.174*** -0.327*** 0.097* 0.164* -0.005 -0.011 0.044 -0.053 -0.138*** -0.269*** 
meeting
 t-1 (0.029) (0.065) (0.067) (0.103) (0.056) (0.085) (0.018) (0.066) (0.076) (0.128) (0.050) (0.086) 
ROAt-1 × topic- 0.649* 2.364** -0.894 -1.974 -0.253 -0.504 -0.259 -0.312 0.631 2.260 0.765 1.244 
Focused meeting
 
t-1 
(0.388) (1.096) (1.398) (1.869) (0.676) (1.306) (0.309) (1.115) (1.294) (2.345) (0.998) (1.576) 
Age
 t-1 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female
 t-1 -0.452** -0.431** -0.452** -0.450** -0.430** -0.431** -0.438** -0.439** -0.438** -0.435** -0.427** -0.426** 
 
(0.208) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Board size
 t-1 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 -0.027 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Duality
 t-1 -0.327** -0.342** -0.346** -0.345** -0.361** -0.360** -0.347** -0.350** -0.351** -0.349** -0.345** -0.349** 
 
(0.158) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) 
Independent  1.186 1.184 1.144 1.156 1.099 1.108 1.089 1.089 1.077 1.079 1.116 1.104 
directors %
 t-1 (0.840) (0.839) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.834) (0.834) (0.835) (0.834) (0.835) (0.835) 
Largest  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
shareholding%
 t-1 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
State-owned  0.153 0.152 0.152 0.155 0.165 0.163 0.164 0.163 0.161 0.163 0.147 0.148 
enterprises
 t-1 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Ownership  -0.618 -0.636 -0.743 -0.706 -0.706 -0.723 -0.688 -0.700 -0.690 -0.711 -0.814 -0.800 
Concentration
 t-1 (0.662) (0.660) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.661) (0.660) 
Log(employees)
 t-1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Log(firm size)
 t-1 -0.171** -0.172** -0.166** -0.167** -0.176** -0.175** -0.174** -0.177** -0.176** -0.173** -0.155** -0.157** 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) 
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Leverage
 t-1 0.348* 0.373* 0.320 0.315 0.347* 0.346* 0.338* 0.338* 0.334* 0.333* 0.286 0.282 
 
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year&Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  廟2 266.436 253.032 233.729 237.701 229.431 230.207 226.866 226.207 226.685 227.218 234.922 237.079 
Firm-years 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 
This table presents series of logistic regressions with fixed effects. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and 
zero otherwise over the period 2005-2015. ROA is an industry-adjusted ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm 
control transactions (D), changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-specific meetings are defined as (1) is 
the annual meeting frequency for each topic and (2) a dummy variable indicating whether the annual meeting frequency above the median for distribution 
within the same year for each topic from Column (A) to (F). The interaction terms between firm performance and topic-focused meeting frequency capture 
WKHPHHWLQJV¶PRGHUDWHHIIHFWVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2GLVPLVVDODQGILUPSHUIRUPDQFH2WKHUYDULDEOHGHILQLWLRQVDUH provided in Table 4. *p < .10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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TABEL 6A The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of industry adjusted compensation to firm performance  
Industry adjusted 
Compensation 
(A) Nomination (B) Compensation (C) Financial reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate control 
transactions 
(E) Change of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth strategies 
 Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
ROA
 t-1 1.195*** 1.201*** 1.076*** 1.058*** 1.171*** 1.172*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.027*** 1.046*** 0.987*** 0.995*** 
 
(0.139) (0.141) (0.124) (0.126) (0.136) (0.133) (0.150) (0.139) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.084) 
Topic-focused  0.008** 0.015* 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.010 -0.017 0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.016 0.007 0.015 
Meeting t-1 (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) 
ROAt-1 × topic- -0.140** -0.391** -0.280 -0.136 -0.263 -0.523 0.034 0.156 0.208 0.075 0.309*** 0.399** 
focused-meeting
 t-1 (0.068) (0.175) (0.192) (0.271) (0.145) (0.336) (0.054) (0.195) (0.258) (0.430) (0.119) (0.193) 
Board size
 t-1 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Duality
 t-1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) 
Independent  0.241 0.242 0.247 0.247 0.242 0.241 0.243 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.243** 
directors %
 t-1 (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.105) 
Largest  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 
shareholding%
 t-1 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State-owned  -0.091** -0.091** -0.088** -0.089** -0.090** -0.091** -0.091** -0.092** -0.091** -0.091** -0.090** -0.090*** 
enterprises
 t-1 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) 
Ownership  -0.044 -0.041 -0.022 -0.029 -0.038 -0.037 -0.041 -0.041 -0.039 -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 
Concentration
 t-1 (0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.085) 
Log(employees)
 t-1 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Log(firm size)
 t-1 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) 
Leverage
 t-1 -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.198*** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.024) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 
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Firm-years 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 
This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects over the period 2005-2015. Compensation is the industry adjusted compensation. 
ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), changes of 
equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting are define as (1) is the annual meeting frequency for each 
topic and (2) whether the annual meeting frequency above the median for distribution within the same year for each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-IRFXVHG PHHWLQJ IUHTXHQF\ FDSWXUH WKH PHHWLQJV¶ PRGHUDWLQJ HIIHFWV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ FRPSHQVDWLRQ DQG ILUP
performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 4. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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TABEL 6B The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of excess compensation 
to firm performance  
Excess  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Compensation Nomination Compensation Financial 
reports 
and audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change 
of equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
ROA
 t-1 0.760*** 0.621*** 0.672*** 0.655*** 0.558*** 0.561*** 
 (0.147) (0.129) (0.137) (0.155) (0.125) (0.086) 
Topic-focused  0.016*** 0.034*** 0.011 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
meetingt-1 (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007) 
ROAt-1 × topic-
focused  
-0.155** -0.247 -0.161 -0.037 0.353 0.188* 
meeting
 t-1 (0.075) (0.211) (0.130) (0.060) (0.245) (0.113) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.245 0.245 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Firm-years 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 
This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. Excess Compensation is 
obtained by using the residual from the regression of CEO compensation on more firm characteristics 
(size, performance, board size, board independence and ownership concentration) within the same 
industry and year (details in Footnote 7). Firm performance is an industry-adjusted ROA. 
Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), 
changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-
focused meeting is the frequency of annual meetings for each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-IRFXVHG PHHWLQJ FDSWXUH WKH PHHWLQJV¶ PRGHUDWLQJ HIIHFWV RQ WKe 
relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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TABEL 7 The effects of meeting frequencies on nomination and growth strategy under different 
ownership structure. 
Panel A of this table reports panel data regression (with firm fixed effects) results of models linking 
the interaction terms of nomination meeting frequencies with firm performance to CEO dismissal and 
compensation from 2005 to 2015. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, which equals one if the 
CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nomination 
meeting frequency is the number of annual meetings on nomination. Interaction terms between ROA 
and the nomination meetLQJ IUHTXHQF\FDSWXUH WKHPHHWLQJV¶PRGHUDWLQJHIIHFWVRQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
between CEO dismissal/compensation and firm performance. Panel B of this table shows panel data 
regression (with firm fixed effects) results of models linking the interaction terms of meeting 
frequency on growth strategies with firm performance to compensation.  Compensation is the industry 
adjusted compensation. Meeting frequency of growth strategies is the number of annual meetings on 
growth strategies. Interaction term between ROA and the meeting frequency of growth strategies 
FDSWXUHV WKHPHHWLQJV¶PRGHUDWLQJHIIHFWVRQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2FRPSHQVDWLRQDQGILUP
performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 4. The state controlled firms contain 
firms with state controlling shareholders, while non-state-controlled firms consists of firms with non-
state controlled shareholders. 
 
  
Panel A: The Effects of Nomination Meeting Frequency under Different Ownership Structure. 
 CEO dismissal Compensation  
 (1) State 
controlled firms 
(2) Non-state-
controlled firms 
(3) State 
controlled firms 
(4) Non-state-
controlled firms 
ROA
 t-1 -2.901*** -4.338*** 1.482*** 0.737*** 
 (0.912) (0.912) (0.119) (0.152) 
Nomination meeting  -0.151*** -0.061 0.005 0.020*** 
frequency
 t-1 (0.033) (0.042) (0.005) (0.006) 
ROA
 t-1  × Nomination  0.530 0.910* -0.038 -0.191** 
meeting frequency
 t-1 (0.524) (0.509) (0.064) (0.080) 
Control variables
 t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  ɖ2 217.759 139.543   
Adj. R2   0.110 0.142 
Firm-years 5,844 4,155 7,728 4,146 
     
Panel B: The Effects of Meeting Frequency on Growth Strategies under Different Ownership Structure. 
 Compensation  
 (1) State controlled firms (2) Non-State controlled firms 
ROA
 t-1 1.356*** 0.484*** 
 (0.107) (0.136) 
Growth strategies  -0.009 0.012 
meetings
 t-1 (0.009) (0.012) 
ROA
 t-1 × Growth 0.311** 0.455** 
strategies meetings
 t-1 (0.141) (0.182) 
Control variables
 t-1 Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.497 0.530 
Firm-years 7,728 4,146 
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Appendix A 
$Q ([DPSOHV RI ,QGHSHQGHQW 'LUHFWRU¶ 5HSRUWV &RPSHQVDWLRQ  DQG /RDQ *XDUDQWHHV  ZHUH
discussed on 27 April 2007 in board meeting of Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd 
(WHZS, 000785). 
Stock trading code: 000785 (SHE) 
Company name: Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd (WHZS) 
Announcement date: 27 April 2007 
Independent directors: Tan, Liwen; Li, Yanping; Xie, Huobao 
Topic code: 2-Compensation; 5- Loan Guarantees  
Opinion type: unqualified opinion 
Content:  
3XUVXDQW WR WKH ³*XLGLQJ 2SLQLRQV RQ (VWDEOLVKLQJ ,QGHSHQGHQW 'LUHFWRUV LQ /LVWHG &RPSDQLHV´
³6KHQ]KHQ6WRFN([FKDQJH/LVWLQJ5XOHV´³$UWLFOHVRI$VVRFLDWLRQ´DQG other related regulations, 
ZHZRXOGOLNHWRLVVXHWKHIROORZLQJRSLQLRQRQ:+=6¶VIROORZLQJWZRIROORZLQJLVVXHVSDVVHGDWWKH
fourth meeting of the sixth session of the board of directors: 
 
First, to our best knowledge, we agree that compensations of directors and senior management in 
2006 have meet the plan requirements-" the implementation plan of company directors and senior 
management compensation in 2006" approved by the annual General Meeting (2005). 
 
Second, based on the annual report 2006 of WHZS, the audit report 2006 (2007-421), and the 
³6SHFLDOstatement of controlling shareholders and other related parties possessing fund of the listed 
ILUP´-148) provided by Wuhan Zhonghuan Accounting Firms, we have carefully examined the 
incurred and accumulative amount of loan guarantees, we believe the loan guarantees for subsidiary 
companies in 2006 was 160 million RMB, accumulated to 260 million. No other loan guarantees for 
related parties happened in 2006.  
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Appendix B 
Correlation of Main Variables.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 CEO dismissal 1                    
2 Compensation -0.07** 1 
                 
 
3 Nomination 
meeting 0.23** 0.10** 1                  
4 Compensation 
meeting 0.00 0.22** 0.21** 1                 
5 
Financial reports 
and audit 
meeting 
0.03** 0.05** 0.27** 0.22** 1 
              
 
6 
Corporate control 
transactions 
meeting 
0.04** 0.15** 0.21** 0.14** 0.23** 1 
             
 
7 Change of equity 
structure meeting 0.01 -0.15** -0.08** -0.06** -0.04** -0.06** 1              
8 Growth strategies 
meeting -0.01 0.14** 0.16** 0.20** 0.19** 0.21** -0.06** 1             
9 ROA -0.08** 0.25** -0.06** 0.05** -0.10** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1 
          
 
10 Age -0.13** 0.24** -0.02+ 0.07** 0.00 0.02* -0.05** 0.05** 0.10** 1 
         
 
11 Female 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03** 1 
        
 
12 Board size -0.04** 0.11** 0.00 -0.01 -0.09** 0.02* 0.03** -0.02+ 0.05** 0.06** -0.01+ 1 
       
 
13 Duality 0.01 -0.02+ 0.01 0.05** 0.08** -0.03** 0.00 0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.01+ -0.12** 1 
      
 
14 Independent directors % 0.02** 0.07** 0.03** 0.06** 0.06** 0.03** -0.06** 0.07** -0.02** 0.02** -0.02* -0.32** 0.05** 1       
15 Largest 
shareholding% 0.02* 0.08** 0.00 -0.01 -0.07** 0.02+ -0.03** 0.01 0.10** 0.09** -0.01 0.06** -0.12** 0.06** 1      
16 State-owned 
enterprises 0.05** 0.00 -0.04** -0.13** -0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.08** -0.02* 0.06** -0.03** 0.20** -0.17** -0.05** 0.39** 1     
17 Ownership Concentration 0.02+ 0.07** 0.00 -0.02** -0.08** 0.04** -0.02* -0.02* 0.13** 0.07** -0.01 0.08** -0.12** 0.03** 0.76** 0.24** 1    
18 Log(employees) -0.05** 0.31** 0.00 0.08** -0.05** 0.13** -0.05** 0.09** 0.13** 0.20** -0.04** 0.26** -0.07** 0.02** 0.22** 0.24** 0.25** 1 
 
 
19 Log(firm size) -0.04** 0.54** 0.05** 0.13** -0.02** 0.20** -0.11** 0.12** 0.17** 0.24** -0.02** 0.25** -0.10** 0.10** 0.34** 0.23** 0.35** 0.68** 1  
20 Leverage 0.05** -0.09** 0.00 -0.04** 0.02* 0.08** 0.01 -0.07** -0.18** -0.09** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.05** -0.02* -0.04** -0.01 0.04** 1 
CEO dismissal is a dichotomous variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. Compensation is equal to the nature logarithm of the 
average of the three highest-SDLG H[HFXWLYHV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ. Other variables are lagged values. Meetings definitions are provided in Table 1, and other 
independent variable definitions are shown in Table 2. SSS 
 
  
Appendix C CEO dismissal, board meetings and firm long-term performance 
Panel A: The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity of CEO Dismissal to firm long-term 
Performance. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 
Nomination Compensation Financial 
reports and 
audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
Accumulated ROA
 t-3 to t-1 -1.519*** -1.404*** -1.160** -0.963* -1.425*** -1.442*** 
 (0.522) (0.478) (0.502) (0.562) (0.470) (0.485) 
Topic- specific -0.184*** -0.140* 0.071 -0.003 -0.037 -0.132** 
meetingt-1 (0.032) (0.075) (0.068) (0.021) (0.158) (0.055) 
Accumulated ROA
 t-3 to t-1× -0.002 0.220 -0.553 -0.225 1.091 0.310 
topic-specific -meetingt-1 (0.249) (0.647) (0.484) (0.170) (1.318) (0.488) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  廟2 238.345 205.030 204.289 203.123 202.176 207.582 
Firm-years 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 
       
Panel B: The Effects of Accumulated Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity of CEO Dismissal to firm 
long-term Performance. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 
Nomination Compensation Financial 
reports and 
audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
Accumulated ROA t-3 to t-1 -1.557*** -1.423*** -1.283** -1.390** -1.513*** -1.467*** 
 (0.594) (0.483) (0.531) (0.640) (0.493) (0.504) 
Accumulated topic- specific -0.122*** -0.073 0.050 -0.006 -0.000 -0.070** 
meeting
  t-3 to t-1 (0.021) (0.045) (0.042) (0.012) (0.069) (0.033) 
Acted.ROA
 t-3 to t-1×Acted. -0.006 0.180 -0.087 0.001 0.398 0.129 
topic-specific-meeting
  t-3 to t-1 (0.146) (0.361) (0.260) (0.085) (0.464) (0.302) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, Industry and Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 廟2 236.436 204.283 203.183 201.639 202.111 205.977 
Firm-years 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 
Panel C: The Accumulated Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity of CEO Dismissal to 
firm Performance 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 Nominatio
n 
Compensation Financial 
reports 
and audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
ROAt-1 -0.949 -0.893 -0.151 -0.191 -1.047 -1.166 
 (0.946) (0.815) (0.891) (1.020) (0.805) (0.835) 
ROAt-2 -2.054** -2.372*** -2.298*** -2.792*** -2.554*** -2.309*** 
 (0.904) (0.782) (0.838) (0.964) (0.783) (0.799) 
ROAt-3 -1.722** -0.993 -0.658 -1.425 -0.588 -1.231 
 (0.869) (0.755) (0.811) (0.940) (0.763) (0.771) 
Topic
 t-1 -0.205*** -0.128* 0.059 -0.005 -0.025 -0.120** 
 (0.032) (0.076) (0.068) (0.021) (0.163) (0.055) 
Topic
 t-2 -0.145*** -0.076 0.114 0.014 0.175* -0.085 
 (0.034) (0.081) (0.071) (0.021) (0.091) (0.061) 
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This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. CEO dismissal is the 
dependent variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise over the period 
2005-2015. ROA is an industry-adjusted ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports 
and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) 
are the major topics discussed. Accumulated ROA is the running average of ROA from t-3 to t-1. 
Accumulated topic-specific meetings are the running average of topic-specific meetings from t-3 to t-
1. Here *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
 
 
  
Topic
 t-3 -0.012 0.015 -0.081 -0.034 -0.156* 0.006 
 (0.033) (0.090) (0.078) (0.023) (0.091) (0.068) 
ROA ×Topic
 t-1 -0.335 -0.729 -1.945 -0.514 3.085 0.907 
 (0.534) (1.665) (1.859) (0.367) (3.396) (1.167) 
ROA ×Topic
 t-2 -0.632 0.579 -0.618 0.246 1.579 -0.134 
 (0.566) (1.765) (0.888) (0.364) (1.510) (1.218) 
ROA ×Topic
 t-3 0.727 2.276 -0.554 0.431 -1.043 3.252 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, Industry and Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 廟2 236.436 204.283 203.183 201.639 202.111 205.977 
Firm-years 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 
Joint significant test: whether coefficients on (Xt-3, Xt-2, Xt-1) =  zero  simultaneously (p-value are reported here) 
 (ROAt-1, ROAt-2,  ROAt-3)  0.026 0.009 0.043 0.018 0.007 0.008 
(Topic
 t-1, Topic t-2, Topic t-3):   0.000 0.271 0.198 0.460 0.034 0.065 
(ROA×Topic
 t-3,  ROA×Topic t-2 
ROA×Topic
 t-1) 
0.286 0.639 0.155 0.286 0.450 0.166 
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Appendix D 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis on the Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity 
of CEO compensation to firm Performance.  
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 
Nomination Compensation 
Financial 
reports and 
audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
Compensation t-1 0.352*** 0.259*** 0.153* 0.344*** 0.259*** 0.256*** 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.081) (0.104) (0.052) (0.075) 
ROA t 0.709*** 1.022** 1.556*** 1.913** 0.704* 0.083 
 (0.157) (0.462) (0.596) (0.748) (0.402) (0.457) 
Topic-focused  0.011** -0.019 0.031 0.003 -0.191** 0.256*** 
meeting t (0.005) (0.049) (0.038) (0.019) (0.077) (0.037) 
ROAt × topic- -0.188*** -0.130 -0.531 0.302 1.282 1.268** 
focused-meetings t (0.070) (0.510) (0.387) (0.245) (1.030) (0.580) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.13 0.13 0.61 0.07 0.09 0.30 
Over-identification 
test p-value 
0.13 0.11 0.152 0.26 0.26 0.21 
The table reports the regression results with dynamic GMM estimator. Compensation is the industry 
adjusted compensation. ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nominations (A), 
compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), changes of equity 
structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting 
frequency is the frequency of annual meetings on each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-IRFXVHGPHHWLQJIUHTXHQF\FDSWXUHWKHPHHWLQJV¶PRGHUDWLQJHIIHFWVRQWKH
relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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Appendix E  
The number of words for each topic and quality of corporate governance. 
 
 
Panel B The number of words and the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm performance 
 (A) 
Nomination 
(B) 
Compensation 
(C) Financial 
reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate 
control 
transactions 
(E) Change 
of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth 
strategies 
ROA t-1  -3.1537*** -2.6923 -3.1818** -2.0055** -1.7858** -2.8619*** 
 (0.8531) (1.6938) (1.3601) (0.7884) (0.9093) (1.0177) 
Topic-focused words t-1 -0.0004*** 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ROAt-1 × topic- 0.0032** -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0024 0.0049 
Focused words t-1 (0.0016) (0.0052) (0.0064) (0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0031) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  ·2 153.52 68.12 48.21 142.15 88.65 81.12 
Firm-years 5,389 1,151 1,439 5,474 3,776 2,852 
       
Panel C The number of words and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance 
 (A) 
Nomination 
(B) 
Compensation 
(C) Financial 
reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate 
control 
transactions 
(E) Change 
of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth 
strategies 
ROA t-1  1.1770*** 1.5942*** 0.8023*** 1.0632*** 1.1324*** 1.2312*** 
 (0.1100) (0.3353) (0.1880) (0.1042) (0.1193) (0.1381) 
Topic-focused words t-1 0.0000*** 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ROAt-1 × topic- -0.0004** -0.0008 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004* 
Focused words t-1 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.100 0.178 0.091 0.098 0.106 0.117 
Firm-years 8,717 2,164 2,392 8,830 6,015 4,838 
This table presents the average number of words for main topics and the regression results for CEO 
dismissal and compensation models using the number of words. CEO dismissal is the dependent 
variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise over the period 2005-2015. 
ROA is an industry-adjusted ROA. Compensation is the industry adjusted compensation. ROA is an 
industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit 
(C), firm control transactions (D), changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the 
major topics discussed. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 3. Models are estimated over 
the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Panel A The number of words for each topic 
  
(A) 
Nomination 
(B) 
Compensation 
(C) 
Financial 
reports 
and audit 
(D) 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
(E)  
Change of 
equity 
structure 
(F)  
Growth 
strategies 
Number of words 244.52 361.45 250.30 366.74 370.61 352.13 
